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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all parties to the 
proceeding in the district court. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah 
Code Ann. (1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that there is no identity of interest 
between a married couple, sharing the same residence where a complaint was served, 
such that the relation-back doctrine does not apply to plaintiffs amended complaint and 
the original, timely-filed complaint? 
The review of an order granting summary judgment presents questions of law, 
which this Court reviews for correctness. Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999); Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995). 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court views the facts and all 
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
(here, the plaintiff). Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). Moreover, this Court does not defer to the trial court's conclusions "that 
facts are undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts." Id. The Court 
will affirm "only if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 
undisputed facts." Id. 
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This issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 63), 
and the memoranda and other papers filed by the parties in support of and in opposition to 
defendant's motion (R. 75, 81, 101). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the issue and provides as 
follows: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion [for summary 
judgment], memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Court Below 
The underlying claim in this case is an action to recover for personal injuries as a 
result of an automobile collision between vehicles driven by plaintiff Sandy Brooke and 
Mrs. Wendy Clark. The original complaint named and was served on Mr. Robert Clark. 
An amended complaint was filed adding Mrs. Wendy Clark as a defendant 13 days after 
the applicable statute of limitations elapsed. Mrs. Wendy Clark filed an answer and then 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run prior 
to her knowledge of the claims against her; she argued that the plaintiffs amended 
complaint should not relate back because she does not have an identity of interest with her 
husband (R. 63, 101, 103). The plaintiff asserted that Mrs. Wendy Clark was sufficiently 
alerted to the proceedings against her, and therefore, the plaintiffs amended complaint 
should relate back. (R. 75, 78.) The trial court granted Mrs. Clark's motion for summary 
judgment, entered a corresponding order, and entered written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. (R. 188-190.) This appeal followed.1 
1
 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendant Robert S. Clark; and as such, he is not a party 
to this appeal. (R. 113.) 
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B. Statement of Facts 
On January 23, 1997, the plaintiff was in an automobile accident that is the basis 
of the underlying claim in this case. (R.1 -2.) The plaintiff was driving on Lone Peak 
Boulevard in Sandy, Utah, when defendant Wendy Clark crossed the median in her 
vehicle and collided head-on with the plaintiff (R. 2). 
In December 2000, the plaintiff contacted the law firm of Eisenberg & Gilchrist 
regarding her potential personal injury claim (R.111). By the middle of January 2001, 
plaintiffs counsel received and reviewed Sandy Brooke's records pertaining to the 
accident (R. 111). The police report was not in Sandy Brooke's files (R. 111). Knowing 
that the applicable statute of limitations was going to run on January 23, 2001, plaintiffs 
counsel immediately ordered the police report, and questioned the plaintiff regarding the 
facts of her case (R. 111-112). At this time, plaintiff informed her counsel that she 
believed that Robert Clark was the driver of the vehicle that hit her on January 23, 1997 
(R.112). Based on this information, plaintiffs counsel filed a complaint on January 19, 
2001, naming Robert Clark as the sole defendant (R. 112). This complaint was then 
served on Robert Clark at his home, on January 24, 2001 (R. 112). 
The complaint that defendants Robert and Wendy Clark received at their home 
described the location, time, and events surrounding the accident (R. 1). The complaint 
stated that on January 23, 1997, "the plaintiff and defendant were driving their vehicles 
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in opposite directions on Lone Peak Boulevard in Sandy, Utah" (R. 1 - 2). The complaint 
also indicated that the plaintiff was traveling approximately 10 to 15 miles per hour when 
the "defendant's vehicle came across the median and struck plaintiffs vehicle head on" 
(R. 2). 
On January 25,2001, two days after the applicable statute of limitations had run, 
plaintiffs counsel received a copy of the police report describing the parties involved in 
the accident (R. 112). That same day, Robert Clark called plaintiffs counsel and 
informed them that he was not the driver, and that he was not present at the accident on 
January 23, 1997 (R. 94). During this telephone call, a law clerk working for plaintiffs 
counsel verified that defendant Wendy Clark was Robert Clark's wife, and that they both 
lived at the same address (R. 112). The law clerk that spoke with Robert Clark indicated 
in a letter to Mr. Clark that his reading of the police report showed that Robert Clark was 
the owner and driver of the car, and that Wendy Clark was also in the car at the time of 
the accident (R. 96). After learning that Robert Clark was only the owner of the vehicle, 
and that Wendy Clark was the driver, plaintiffs counsel amended the complaint to add 
Wendy Clark as a defendant (R. 5). 
Defendants Robert and Wendy Clark were both served with plaintiffs amended 
complaint on January 31, 2001 (R. 5-7). On February 12, 2001, the defendants jointly 
answered plaintiffs complaint, and asserted that the plaintiff s claims were barred by the 
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statute of limitations (R. 8 and 12). Mrs. Wendy Clark filed a motion for summary 
judgment arguing that the statute of limitations had run before she had any knowledge of 
any claims asserted against her (R. 107). Robert Clark has never stated that he was not 
familiar with the facts surrounding the accident between his wife and the plaintiff at the 
time the original complaint was served on him (R. 93-94). The trial court granted Wendy 
Clark's motion for summary judgment, from which the plaintiff now appeals. (R. 188 -
189.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
because there is an identity of interest between husband, Mr. Robert Clark, and wife, Mrs. 
Wendy Clark. In addition, Mrs. Clark was sufficiently alerted to the plaintiffs claims 
against her when the complaint was served on her husband at their mutual residence. 
Under URCP 15(c), there is an identity of interest when the real party in inlerest is 
sufficiently alerted to the claims against her. The relation back doctrine then incorporates 
a later filed pleading to an original complaint. Similarly, pursuant to Utah case law 
discussing the relation back doctrine, it is reasonable to assume that when a complaint is 
served on a close relative at their mutual home, the real party in interest has been 
sufficiently alerted to the claims against her. In this case, Mr. Robert Clark was served 
with a complaint at the Clarks' home that described the accident between Mrs. Wendy 
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Clark and the plaintiff. Therefore, this Court should hold it is reasonable to assume that 
Mrs. Wendy Clark was sufficiently alerted to the claims against her, and allow plaintiffs 
amended complaint to relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint. 
II. This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
because analogous federal case law holds that a real party in interest has constructive 
notice of the claims against her when a complaint is served at the party's residence. The 
original complaint in this case was served at Mrs. Clark's home. Therefore, Mrs. Clark 
knew or should have known of the claims that the plaintiff was asserting against her. 
III. Mrs. Clark had notice of the claims against her before Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 4(b)'s requirement that service be completed within 120 days. Under this rule, 
if a complaint is filed before the statute of limitations runs, the plaintiff has 120 days 
before he must effectuate service upon a given party. Pursuant to the relation back 
doctrine included in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice requirement is tied to 
the 120 day time period allowed for service. The amended complaint and summons were 
served on Mrs. Wendy Clark 12 days after the complaint was filed with the court and 
eight days after the statute of limitations ran. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment because Mrs. Clark had notice of the claims 
against her well within the 120 day period allowed under the rules. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Under URCP 15(c), the Clark Defendants, as Husband and Wife Living 
at the Same Address, Share an Identity of Interest Sufficient for 
Relation Back of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint 
The Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment because 
Robert Clark and Wendy Clark had a sufficient identity of interest to allow the relation 
back of plaintiff s amended complaint to the date of filing of the plaintiffs original 
complaint. Under Utah law, there is an identity of interest, and the relation back of a 
pleading is appropriate when "the real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings." Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Because the 
original complaint described the details of the underlying accident, and because it was 
served on Mrs. Clark's husband, Robert Clark, at their mutual home, this Court should 
hold that Mrs. Wendy Clark was sufficiently alerted to the proceedings and reverse the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "whenever the claim or defense asserted 
in the amended pleading arouse out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading." UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(c). Moreover, the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, including Rule 15(c), are to be "liberally construed." UTAH R. CIV. P. 1(a) 
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Applying this liberal construction model to Rule 15(c), the Supreme Court of Utah 
held that a plaintiffs complaint which misnamed Geneva Rock Products Inc. as "Geneva 
Rock Corporation" would relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint upon 
amendment. Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1996). In its 
analysis of the relation back doctrine, the Supreme Court of Utah explained that "the 
fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute... What 
[the parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. 
When this is accomplished, that is all that is required." Id. at 369. The Court stated that 
even though Rule 15(c) generally is not applied to amendments that add additional 
parties, an exception exists when new and old parties have an identity of interest. Id. at 
369. More importantly, the Court explained that "the rationale underpinning this 
exception is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of limitations; to prevent 
adjudication of a claim." Id. at 370. 
In Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) the Utah Court of 
Appeals considered a case where the parents were incorrectly served when it was the 
custodial children of those parents who were actually at fault. Id. at 499. The complaint 
was served on the parents at the homes where the children lived; it identified the children 
as the negligent parties in the body of the complaint, but it did not name the children as 
9 
defendants in the case. Id. 499 and 501. After the statute of limitations had run, the 
plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add the children as defendants. Id. at 500 -
501. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that relation back 
was not appropriate, and that the addition of the children was untimely. Id. at 500. This 
Court reversed the trial court's ruling, and held that "under these circumstances, it is 
entirely reasonable to assume that [the children] were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings, and that they thus had sufficient identity of interest with their parents, to 
make relation back appropriate." Id. at 501 .(Emphasis Added). 
Just as it is entirely reasonable to assume that the children in the Sulzen case were 
alerted to the proceedings against them, it is entirely reasonable to assume that Mrs. 
Wendy Clark was alerted to the proceedings against her when the plaintiff in this case 
served her complaint on Wendy Clark's husband. Like the parents and children in the 
Sulzen case, Mr. and Mrs. Clark share the home where the complaint was served, and the 
body of the complaint clearly described the accident between Mrs. Clark and the plaintiff. 
Therefore, this Court should hold that Mrs. Clark was sufficiently alerted to the claims 
against her such that relation back to plaintiffs original complaint is appropriate. 
Defendants may argue that the case at hand is distinguishable from the Sulzen case 
because the body of the complaint did not specifically name Mrs. Clark as the negligent 
party. However the complaint specifically stated that on January 23, 1997, "the plaintiff 
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and defendant were driving their vehicles in opposite directions on Lone Peak Boulevard 
in Sandy, Utah/' when the "defendant's vehicle came across the median and struck 
plaintiffs vehicle head on." The complaint also informed the Clarks that the plaintiffs 
car was traveling at approximately 10 to 15 miles per hour when the accident occurred. 
Hence, the circumstances and events detailed in the complaint sufficiently described the 
accident between Mrs. Clark and the plaintiff. Moreover, despite signing an affidavit 
asserting that he was not the driver, and that he was not present at the time of the 
accident, Mr. Clark has never stated that he was not familiar with the details of the 
accident between his wife and the plaintiff when the complaint was served on him. 
Under these circumstances, it is just as reasonable to assume that a Mrs. Clark was alerted 
to the claims brought against her, as it is to assume that the children were alerted to the 
claims against them in the Sulzen case. Therefore, this Court should hold that Mr. and 
Mrs. Clark had a sufficient identity of interest to allow the plaintiffs amended complaint 
to relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint. 
II. Mrs. Clark had Sufficient Constructive Notice of the Plaintiffs Claims 
to Make Relation Back Appropriate 
When a complaint is served at a person's home that describes conduct in which 
that person was engaged, that person should be held to be on constructive notice of the 
claim against them. In interpreting Rule 15 of the Federal Civil Rules Procedure, which 
is substantially similar to Utah's Rule 15, federal courts have held that constructive notice 
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is sufficient to allow a plaintiffs amended complaint to relate back to the time of filing of 
the original complaint. Seber v. Daniels Transfer Co., 618 F. Supp. 1311 (D.C. Pa. 1985), 
Wong v. Calvin, 87 F.R.D. 145 (D.C. Fla. 1980), Dupree v. Walters, 116 F.R.D. 31 (D.C. 
N.Y. 1987), and Barkins v. International Inns, Inc., 825 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1987)2. More 
importantly, several federal courts have stated that sharing the same address with a served 
party is an example of constructive notice sufficient to support the relation back of an 
amended pleading. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103, 105-106 (10th 
Cir. 1967) and Wong v. Calvin, 87 F.R.D. 145, 150 (D.C. Fla. 1980). 
Utah courts would likely support the conclusion that when a served party shares 
the same address as a later added party, whose negligent conduct was described in the 
original complaint, the later added party had constructive knowledge of the plaintiffs 
claims against her. As previously discussed, one of the most important factors considered 
by the Court in Sulzen was the fact that the parents and children shared the same home. 
Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d at 501. Moreover, the Court's conclusion was that it was 
"entirely reasonable to assume" that the children named in the complaint were alerted to 
2
 Due to the similarity between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, case law interpreting Federal Rules are instructive of the 
manner in which the Utah rules should be applied. Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252 P.2d 
205 (Utah 1953) ("Since these rules were fashioned after the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it is proper that we examine decisions under the Federal Rules to determine 
the meaning thereof."). 
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the proceedings against her when the complaint was served on her spouse at her home. Id. 
at 501. 
In this case, Mr. Clark and Mrs. Clark shared the same residence. In fact, the 
complaint and summons were served on Mr. Robert Clark at their mutual home. Any 
reasonable person would have known, or should have known, that a claim would be 
asserted against them when a complaint is served at their home describing the events 
surrounding an accident in which they were involved. Therefore, this Court should hold 
that Mrs. Clark at least had constructive notice of the proceedings against her such that 
she would not be prejudiced by the relation back of plaintiff s amended complaint. 
III. Mrs. Clark had notice of the Claims Against Her Before the 120 Days 
Allowed for Service Expired 
This Court should hold that Mrs. Clark had adequate knowledge of the claims 
against before the 120 days allowed for service expired such that relation back of the 
plaintiffs amended complaint would be appropriate. 
Under the applicable statute of limitations, an action for negligence may be 
brought or "commenced" within four years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996). Under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint 
with the court." UTAH R. CIV. P. 3(a) (Emphasis Added). More importantly, Rule 4(b) 
provides that plaintiffs are given 120 days after filing the complaint with the court to 
serve the summons and a copy of the complaint on the defendant. UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(b). 
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Thus, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a defendant may not actually receive 
notice of a claim against them until four months after the statute of limitations runs, so 
long as the plaintiff filed his complaint with the court in a timely manner. 
This approach is synonymous with the way that the Federal Rules operate. Under 
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules, when an amendment to a pleading changes the party against 
whom the claim is asserted, notice is sufficient so long as it given to the added party 
within 120 days of filing the complaint with the court. FEDERAL R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3). 
Thus, "the notice required under the rule no longer is tied to the governing limitations 
period, but is linked to the federal service period of 120 days." Charles A. Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498 (Civil 2d ed. 2002). 
In this case, the plaintiff filed her complaint with the court on January 19th 2001. 
On January 23, 2001, the statute of limitations ran. On January 31st, 2001, plaintiffs 
counsel filed an amended complaint to add Mrs. Wendy Clark, which was served on Mrs. 
Clark on the same day. On February 12, 2001, Mrs. Clark filed her answer to plaintiffs 
amended complaint. As the timing of this sequence of events indicates, Mrs. Clark was 
notified of the claim against her well within the 120 days required under the rules. 
Therefore, this Court should hold that relation back of plaintiff s amended complaint is 
appropriate because Mrs. Clark had adequate knowledge of the claims against before the 
120 days allowed for service expired. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, when one spouse is served a complaint that specifically describes 
the negligent conduct of the other spouse, it is entirely reasonable to assume that the other 
spouse had notice of claims against her. Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment because Robert Clark and Wendy Clark had a 
sufficient identity of interest to allow the relation back of plaintiff s amended complaint 
to the original complaint. 
DATED this 5th day March, 2003. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
C. R^ui Christensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of March, 2003,1 caused to be served by U.S. 
mail, first-class postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing on: 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
Michael W. Wright, Esq. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Sail Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 466-4228 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
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Jeffrey D. Eisenberg (4029) 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-9100 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY BROOKE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT S. CLARK, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT AND JURY 
DEMAND 
Civil No. a | ^ q eoSlfS 
Judge bj t 1 fc> A S - ^ * ^ 
Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, hereby complains of defendant as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County. 
2. Upon reasonable belief and suspicion, defendant is a resident of the State of Utah, 
Salt Lake County. 
3. The accident in question occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-3-4 and 78-13-7. The amount of controversy exceeds $10,000. 
5. On January 23,1997, the plaintiff and defendant were driving their vehicles 
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in opposite directions on Lone Peak Boulevard in Sandy, Utah. Plaintiff was traveling at a speed 
of between 10 and 15 miles per hour when defendant's vehicle came across the median and 
struck Plaintiffs vehicle head on. 
6. Plaintiff was thus suddenly and without warning struck head on by defendant in a 
careless, negligent, reckless and unlawful manner. 
7. Defendant was negligent in one or more of the following particulars: 
a. Failure to maintain a proper look-out 
b. Failure to maintain control of his vehicle 
c. Failure to brake properly 
d. Failure to obey traffic signals and the weather conditions 
e. Any and all negligent acts which may be revealed during discovery of this 
matter. 
8. As a result of the careless, negligent, reckless and unlawful conduct of the 
defendant, plaintiff has suffered serious injuries, including a closed head brain injury, neck, 
shoulder and other parts of her body, pain and discomfort, mental and emotional distress, 
disability and loss of enjoyment of life, all to her general damage in an amount to be determined 
at trial. 
9. As a further consequence of the aforesaid careless, negligent, reckless and 
unlawful conduct of the defendant, plaintiff has incurred and may incur in the future expenses 
for medical, hospital, physicians, nursing care and treatment, therapy, rehabilitation and related 
expenses, all to her special damage in an amount to be determined at trial. 
10. At the time of the injury complained of herein, plaintiff was gainfully employed 
as a housekeeper and was enrolled as a full-time student. As a further direct and proximate 
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cause of the aforesaid collision, plaintiff was unable to perform all of her duties in connection 
with her employment, and had to reduce her workload and quit school. She has sustained a loss 
of income and a further loss of future earning capacity. Plaintiff is entitled to recover a 
reasonable amount as special damages for her aforesaid income losses. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant as follows: 
1. For special damages, including but not limited to, medical expenses and lost 
earnings to the date of the trial in an amount to be determined at trial. 
2. For general damages, including but not limited to, loss of future earnings and 
earning capacity, future medical expenses, pain, suffering, disability and emotional anguish in 
an amount to be proven at trial. 
3. For pre- and post-judgment interest as provided by the law on special damages. 
4. For costs of this action, attorneys' fees, and for such other and further relief as 
this Court deems just under the circumstances. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury of all issues triable by jury in this action, for which 
the fee is submitted herewith. 
DATED this / f t of January, 2001. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
Plaintiffs Address: 
966 East Granite Peak Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094-7030 
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Jeffrey D. Eisenberg (4029) 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-9100 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY BROOKE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND JURY DEMAND 
1 Civil No. 010900583 
ROBERT S. CLARK, and 
WENDY K. CLARK, 
Defendant. 
Judge Livingston 
Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, hereby complains of defendants as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County. 
2. Upon reasonable belief and suspicion, defendants are residents of the State of 
Utah, Salt Lake County. 
3. The accident in question occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-3-4 and 78-13-7. The amount of controversy exceeds $10,000. 
1 
5. On January 23, 1997, the plaintiff and defendant were driving their vehicles 
in opposite directions on Lone Peak Boulevard in Sandy, Utah. Plaintiff was traveling at a speed 
of between 10 and 15 miles per hour when defendants' vehicle came across the median and 
struck Plaintiffs vehicle head on. 
6. Plaintiff was thus suddenly and without warning struck head on by defendants in 
a careless, negligent, reckless and unlawful manner. 
7. Defendants were negligent in one or more of the following particulars: 
a. Failure to maintain a proper look-out 
b. Failure to maintain control of their vehicle 
c. Failure to brake properly 
d. Failure to obey traffic signals and the weather conditions 
e. Any and all negligent acts which may be revealed during discovery of this 
matter. 
8. As a result of the careless, negligent, reckless and unlawful conduct of the 
defendants, and each of them, plaintiff has suffered serious injuries, including a closed head 
brain injury, neck, shoulder and other parts of her body, pain and discomfort, mental and 
emotional distress, disability and loss of enjoyment of life, all to her general damage in an 
amount to be determined at trial. 
9. As a further consequence of the aforesaid careless, negligent, reckless and 
unlawful conduct of the defendants, plaintiff has incurred and may incur in the future expenses 
for medical, hospital, physicians, nursing care and treatment, therapy, rehabilitation and related 
expenses, all to her special damage in an amount to be determined at trial. 
10. At the time of the injury complained of herein, plaintiff was gainfully employed 
2 
as a housekeeper and was enrolled as a full-time student. As a further direct and proximate 
cause of the aforesaid collision, plaintiff was unable to perform all of her duties in connection 
with her employment, and had to reduce her workload and quit school. She has sustained a loss 
of income and a further loss of future earning capacity. Plaintiff is entitled to recover a 
reasonable amount as special damages for her aforesaid income losses. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant as follows: 
1. For special damages, including but not limited to, medical expenses and lost 
earnings to the date of the trial in an amount to be determined at trial. 
2. For general damages, including but not limited to, loss of future earnings and 
earning capacity, future medical expenses, pain, suffering, disability and emotional anguish in 
an amount to be proven at trial. 
3. For pre- and post-judgment interest as provided by the law on special damages. 
4. For costs of this action, attorneys' fees, and for such other and further relief as 
this Court deems just under the circumstances. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury of all issues triable by jury in this action, for which 
the fee is submitted herewit jh. 
DATED this O of January, 2001. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST / 
). Eisenberg 
AttorneV for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
966 East Granite Peak Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094-7030 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER (4324) 
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT (6153) 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
(801)466-4228 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SANDY BROOKE, : ORDER 
(WENDY K. CLARK) 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
ROBERT S. CLARK, and WENDY K. 
CLARK, : Civil No.: 010900583 
Defendants. : Judge Roger A. Livingston 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court pursuant to notice on defendant 
Wendy K. Ciark's Motion to Dismiss. Based upon the pleadings on filed, the Affidavits of 
the parties, the arguments of counsel and being well informed in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendant Wendy K. Clark's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is granted. 
This Judgment is made upon the following Undisputed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Jl-j X$ ?002 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff's cause of action against Wendy K. Clark was for personal 
injuries, which arose out of an automobile accident that occurred on January 23, 1997. 
2. The plaintiff did not name Wendy K. Clark as a defendant in this matter 
until January 31, 2001. 
3. The applicable Statute of Limitations for this case requires that it be 
brought within four years of the date of the accident. 
4. The defendant, Wendy K. Clark, properly plead and raised the issue of 
the Statute of Limitations. 
5. The plaintiff's initial complaint named Robert Clark, the husband of 
Wendy K. Clark, as the sole defendant in this matter, and was filed on January 19, 
2001. 
6. That complaint did not state a cause of action against Wendy Clark. 
7. Defendant Wendy K. Clark was formally served with a summons and copy 
of the complaint in February of 2001. 
8. Defendant Wendy K. Clark did not know that Plaintiff had made a claim for 
personal injuries until she was served with a summons and complaint in this matter in 
February of 2001. 
9. The amended complaint naming Wendy K. Clark as a defendant does not 
relate back in time to the filing of the initial lawsuit because there is not an identity of 
interest between Defendants Robert Clark and Wendy Clark. 
2 
10 The Complaint against Wendy K. Clark is therefore barred by the relevant 
Statute of Limitations because it was untimely under the relevant Statute of Limitations. 
11. Dismissal with prejudice is the proper remedy for failure to bring a timely 
claim. 
DATED this day of June, 2002. 
HONORABLE ROGERA. LIVINGSTON 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER (WENDY K. 
CLARK) was mailed, postage pre-paid, this day of June, 2002, to: 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS Rule 15 
The sentence reading "The third-party defendant is bound 
by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiffs liability to 
the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff, or to the 
third-party plaintiff' has been stricken from Rule 14(a), not 
to change the law, but because the sentence states a rule of 
substantive law which is not within the scope of a procedural 
rule. It is not the purpose of the rules to state the effect of a 
judgment. 
The elimination of the words "the third-party plaintiff, or 
any other party" from the second sentence of rule 14(a), 
together with the insertion of the new phrases therein, are 
not changes of substance but are merely for the purpose of 
clarification. 
1963 Amendment 
Under the amendment of the initial sentences of the 
subdivision, a defendant as a third-party plaintiff may freely 
and without leave of court bring in a third-party defendant if 
he files the third-party complaint not later than 10 days after 
he serves his original answer. When the impleader comes so 
early in the case, there is little value in requiring a prelimi-
nary ruling by the court on the propriety of the impleader. 
After the third-party defendant is brought in, the court has 
discretion to strike the third-party claim if it is obviously 
unmeritorious and can only delay or prejudice the disposition 
of the plaintiffs claim, or to sever the third-party claim or 
accord it separate trial if confusion or prejudice would other-
wise result. This discretion, applicable not merely to the 
cases covered by the amendment where the third-party 
defendant is brought in without leave, but to all impleaders 
under the rule, is emphasized in the next-to-last sentence of 
the subdivision, added by amendment. 
In dispensing with leave of court for an impleader filed not 
later than 10 days after serving the answer, but retaining the 
leave requirement for impleaders sought to be effected 
thereafter, the amended subdivision takes a moderate posi-
tion on the lines urged by some commentators, see Note, 43 
Minn.L.Rev. 115 (1958); cf. Pa.R.Civ.P. 2252-53 (60 days 
after service on the defendant; Minn.R.Civ.P. 14.01 (45 
days). Other commentators would dispense with the re-
quirement of leave regardless of the time when impleader is 
effected, and would rely on subsequent action by the court to 
dismiss the impleader if it would unduly delay or complicate 
the litigation or would be otherwise objectionable. See 1A 
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure 649-50 
(Wright ed. 1960); Comment, 58 Colum.L.Rev. 532, 546 
(1958); cf. N.Y.Civ.PracAct § 193-a; Me.R.Civ.P. 14. The 
amended subdivision preserves the value of a preliminary 
screening, through the leave procedure, of impleaders at-
tempted after the 10-day period. 
The amendment applies also when an impleader is initiated 
by a third-party defendant against a person who may be 
liable to him, as provided in the last sentence of the subdivi-
sion. 
1966 Amendment 
Rule 14 was modeled on Admiralty Rule 56. An important 
feature of Admiralty Rule 56 was that it allowed impleader 
not only of a person who might be liable to the defendant by 
way of remedy over, but also of any person who might be 
hable to the plaintiff. The importance of this provision was 
that the defendant was entitled to insist that the plaintiff 
Complete Annotation Mat 
proceed to judgment against the third-party defendant. In 
certain cases this was a valuable implementation of a sub-
stantive right. For example, in a case of ship collision where 
a finding of mutual fault is possible, one shipowner, if sued 
alone, faces the prospect of an absolute judgment for the full 
amount of the damage suffered by an innocent third party; 
but if he can implead the owner of the other vessel, and if 
mutual fault ]s found, the judgment against the original 
defendant will be in the first instance only for a moiety of the 
damages; liability for the remainder will be conditioned on 
the plaintiffs inability to collect from the third-party defen-
dant. 
This feature was originally incorporated in Rule 14, but 
was eliminated by the amendment of 1946, so that under the 
amended rule a third party could not be impleaded on the 
basis that he might be liable to the plaintiff. One of the 
reasons for the amendment was that the Civil Rule, unlike 
the Admiralty Rule, did not require the plaintiff to go to 
judgment against the third-party defendant. Another reason 
was that where jurisdiction depended on diversity of citizen-
ship the impleader of an adversary having the same citizen-
ship as the plaintiff was not considered possible. 
Retention of the admiralty practice in those cases that will 
be counterparts of a suit in admiralty is clearly desirable. 
1987 Amendment 
The amendments are technical. No substantive change is 
intended. 
2000 Amendment 
Subdivisions (a) and (c) are amended to reflect revisions in 
Supplemental Rule C(6). 
GAP Report 
Rule B(l)(a) was modified by moving "in an in personam 
action" out of paragraph (a) and into the first line of subdivi-
sion (1). This change makes it clear that all paragraphs of 
subdivision (1) apply when attachment is sought in an in 
personam action. Rule B(l)(d) was modified by changing the 
requirement that the clerk deliver the summons and process 
to the person or organization authorized to serve it. The new 
form requires only that the summons and process be deliv-
ered, not that the clerk effect the delivery. This change 
conforms to present practice in some districts and will facili-
tate rapid service. It matches the spirit of Civil Rule 4(b), 
which directs the clerk to issue the summons "to the plaintiff 
for service on the defendant." A parallel change is made in 
Rule C(3)(b). 
R u l e 15 . Amended and Supplemental Plead-
ings 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend the party's 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before 
a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and 
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, 
the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the 
party's pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
ials, see Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
Rule 15 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, 
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may 
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence 
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the 
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the plead-
ings to be amended and shall do so freely when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be sub-
served thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy 
the court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action 
or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a 
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such 
evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amend-
ment of a pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading when 
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that 
provides the statute of limitations applicable to the 
action, or 
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading, or 
(3) the amendment changes the party or the 
naming of the party against whom a claim is assert-
ed if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, 
within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service 
of the summons and complaint, the party to be 
brought in by amendment (A) has received such 
notice of the institution of the action that the party 
will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on 
the merits, and (B) knew or should have known 
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of 
the proper party, the action would have been 
brought against the party. 
The delivery or mailing of process to the United 
States Attorney, or United States Attorney's designee, 
or the Attorney General of the United States, or an 
agency or officer who would have been a proper 
defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of sub-
paragraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph (3) with 
respect to the United States or any agency or officer 
thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant. 
Complete Annotation Matt 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of
 a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit the party to serve !a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or 
occurrences or events which have happened.since the 
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Per-
mission may be granted even though the original 
pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for 
relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that 
the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading; 
it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
(As amended Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963; Feb. 28, 1966; 
eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30 
1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Dec. 9,1991, Pub.L. 102-198, § 11(a)' 
105 Stat. 1626; Apr. 22,1993, eff. Dec. 1,1993.) 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES 
1937 Adoption 
See generally for the present federal practice, [former] 
Equity Rules 19 (Amendments Generally), 28 (Amendment of 
Bill as of Course), 32 (Answer to Amended Bill), 34 (Supple-
mental Pleading), and 35 (Bills of Revivor and Supplemental 
Bills—Form); U.S.C. Title 28, § 399 [now 1653] (Amend-
ments to show diverse citizenship) and [former] 777 (Defects 
of form; amendments). See English Rules Under the Judi-
cature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 28, r. r. 1-13; Q. 
20, r. 4; O. 24, r. r. 1-3. 
Note to Subdivision (a). The right to serve an amended 
pleading once as of course is common. 4 Mont.Rev.Codes 
Ann. (1935) § 9186; 1 Ore.Code Ann. (1930) § 1-904; 1 
S.C.Code (Michie, 1932) § 493; English Rules Under the 
Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 28, r. 2. 
Provision for amendment of pleading before trial, by leave of 
court, is in almost every code. If there is no statute the 
power of the court to grant leave is said to be inherent. 
Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 498, 509. 
Note to Subdivision (b). Compare [former] Equity Rule 
19 (Amendments Generally) and code provisions which allow 
an amendment "at any time in furtherance of justice," (e.g., 
Ark.Civ.Code (Crawford, 1934) § 155) and which allow an 
amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence, where 
the adverse party has not been misled and prejudiced (e.g., 
N.M.Stat.Ann. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 105-601,105-602). 
Note to Subdivision (c). "Relation back" is a well recog-
nized doctrine of recent and now more frequent application. 
Compare Ala.Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 9513; Smith-Hurd 
IlLStats. ch. 110, § 170(2); 2 Wash.Rev.StatAnn. (Reming-
ton, 1932) § 308-3(4). See U.S.C, Title 28, § 399 [now 1653] 
(Amendments to show diverse citizenship) for a provision for 
delation back". 
Note to Subdivision (d). This is an adaptation of former 
Equity Rule 34 (Supplemental Pleading). 
1963 Amendment 
Rule 15(d) is intended to give the court broad discretion in 
allowing a supplemental pleading. However, some cases, 
opposed by other cases and criticized by the commentators, 
have taken the rigid and formalistic view that where the 
original complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, leave to serve a supplemental complaint must be 
als, see Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS Rule 15 
denied. See Bonner v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F.2d 703 
(2d Cir. 1949); Bowles v. Senderowitz, 65 F.Supp. 548 
{E.D.Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 158 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 
1946), cert, denied, Senderowitz v. Fleming, 330 U.S. 848, 67 
S.Ct. 1091, 91 L.Ed. 1292 (1947); cf. LaSalle Nat Bank v. 
222 East Chestnut St Corp., 267 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 361 U.S. 836, 80 S.Ct. 88, 4 L.Ed.2d 77 (1959). But 
see Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 257 
F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1958); Genuth v. National Biscuit Co., 81 
F.Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.1948), app. dism., 177 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 
1949); 3 Moore's Federal Practice 1J15.01[5] (Supp.1960); 1A 
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure 820-21 
(Wright ed. 1960). Thus plaintiffs have sometimes been 
needlessly remitted to the difficulties of commencing a new 
action even though events occurring after the commencement 
of the original action have made clear the right to relief. 
Under the amendment the court has discretion to permit a 
supplemental pleading despite the fact that the original 
pleading is defective. As in other situations where a supple-
mental pleading is offered, the court is to determine in the 
light of the particular circumstances whether filing should be 
permitted, and if so, upon what terms. The amendment does 
not attempt to deal with such questions as the relation of the 
statute of limitations to supplemental pleadings, the opera-
tion of the doctrine of laches, or the availability of other 
defenses. All these questions are for decision in accordance 
with the principles applicable to supplemental pleadings gen-
erally. Cf. Blau v. Lamb, 191 F.Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y.1961); 
Lendonsol Amusement Corp. v. B. & Q. Assoc, Inc., 23 
F.R.Serv. 15d.3, Case 1 (D.Mass.1957). 
1966 Amendment 
Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more clearly when an 
amendment of a pleading changing the party against whom a 
claim is asserted (including an amendment to correct a 
misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) shall "relate 
back" to the date of the original pleading. 
The problem has arisen most acutely in certain actions by 
private parties against officers or agencies of the United 
States. Thus an individual denied social security benefits by 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare may secure 
review of the decision by bringing a civil action against that 
officer within sixty days. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. Ill, 
1962). In several recent cases the claimants instituted time-
ly action but mistakenly named as defendant the United 
States, the Department of HEW, the "Federal Security 
Administration" (a nonexistent agency), and a Secretary who 
had retired from the office nineteen days before. Discover-
ing their mistakes, the claimants moved to amend their 
complaints to name the proper defendant; by this time the 
statutory sixty-day period had expired. The motions were 
denied on the ground that the amendment "would amount to 
the commencement of a new proceeding and would not relate 
back in time so as to avoid the statutory provision * * * that 
suit be brought within sixty days * * *" Cohn v. Federal 
Security Adm., 199 F.Supp. 884, 885 (W.D.N.Y.1961); see 
also Cunningham v. United States, 199 F.Supp. 541 
(W.D.Mo.1958); Hall v. Department of HEW, 199 F.Supp. 
833 (S.D.Tex.1960); Sandridge v. Folsom, Secretary of 
HEW, 200 F.Supp. 25 (M.D.Tenn.1959). [The Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare has approved certain amelio-
rative regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See 29 Fed. 
Reg. 8209 (June 30, 1964); Jacoby, The Effect of Recent 
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Changes in the Law of "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review, 53 
Geo.L.J. 19, 42-43 (1964); see also Simmons v. United States 
Dept HEW, 328 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1964).] 
Analysis in terms, of "new proceeding" is traceable to 
Davis v. L. L. Cohen & Co., 268 U.S. 638 (1925), and Mellon 
v. Arkansas Land & Lumber Co., 275 U.S. 460 (1928), but 
those cases antedate the adoption of the Rules which import 
different criteria for determining when an amendment is to 
"relate back". As lower courts have continued to rely on the 
Davis and Mellon cases despite the contrary intent of the 
Rules, clarification of Rule 15(c) is considered advisable. 
Relation back is intimately connected with the policy of the 
statute of limitations. The policy of the statute limiting the 
time for suit against the Secretary of HEW would not have 
been offended by allowing relation back in the situations 
described above. For the government was put on notice of 
the claim within the stated period—in the particular instanc-
es, by means of the initial delivery of process to a responsible 
government official (see Rule 4(d)(4) and (5)). In these 
circumstances, characterization of the amendment as a new 
proceeding is not responsive to the realty [sic], but is merely 
question-begging; and to deny relation back is to defeat 
unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove his case. See 
the full discussion by Byse, Suing the <rWrong" Defendant in 
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Propos-
als for Reform, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 40 (1963); see also Ill.Civ.P. 
Act § 46(4). 
Much the same question arises in other types of actions 
against the government (see Byse, supra, at 45 n. 15). In 
actions between private parties, the problem of relation back 
of amendments changing defendants has generally been bet-
ter handled by the courts, but incorrect criteria have some-
times been applied, leading sporadically to doubtful results. 
See 1A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 451 (Wright ed. 1960); 1 id. § 186 (1960); 2 id. § 543 
(1961); 3 Moore's Federal Practice, par. 15.15 (Cum.Supp. 
1962); Annot., Change in Party After Statute of Limitations 
Has Run, 8 A.L.R.2d 6 (1949). Rule 15(c) has been ampli-
fied to provide a general solution. An amendment changing 
the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the 
amendment satisfies the usual condition of Rule 15(c) of 
"arising out of the conduct * * * set forth * * * in the 
original pleading," and ii, within the applicable limitations 
period, the party brought in by amendment, first, received 
such notice of the institution of the action—the notice need 
not be formal—that he would not be prejudiced in defending 
the action, and, second, knew or should have known that the 
action would have been brought against him initially had 
there not been a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party. Revised Rule 15(c) goes on to provide specifi-
cally in the government cases that the first and second 
requirements are satisfied when the government has been 
notified in the manner there described (see Rule 4(d)(4) and 
(5)). As applied to the government cases, revised Rule 15(c) 
further advances the objectives of the 1961 amendment of 
Rule 25(d) (substitution of public officers). 
The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not 
expressly treated in revised Rule 15(c) since the problem is 
generally easier. Again the chief consideration of policy is 
that of the statute of limitations, and the attitude taken in 
revised Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by 
analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs. Also relevant is 
the amendment of Rule 17(a) (real party in interest). To 
als, see Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
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avoid forfeitures of just claims, revised Rule 17(a) would 
provide that no action shall be dismissed on the ground that 
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest 
until a reasonable time has been allowed for correction of the 
defect in the manner there stated. 
1987 Amendment 
The amendments are technical. No substantive change is 
intended. 
1991 Amendment 
The rule has been revised to prevent parties against whom 
claims are made from taking unjust advantage of otherwise 
inconsequential pleading errors to sustain a limitations de-
fense. 
Paragraph (c)(1). This provision is new. It is intended 
to make it clear that the rule does not apply to preclude any 
relation back that may be permitted under the applicable 
limitations law. Generally, the applicable limitations law will 
be state law. If federal jurisdiction is based on the citizen-
ship of the parties, the primary reference is the law of the 
state in which the district court sits. Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). If federal jurisdiction is based on 
a federal question, the reference may be to the law of the 
state governing relations between the parties. E.g., Board of 
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). In some circum-
stances, the controlling limitations law may be federal law. 
E.g., West v. Conrail, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 1538 (1987). Cf. Bur-
lington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Stewart 
Organization v. Ricoh, 108 S.Ct. 2239 (1988). Whatever may 
be the controlling body of limitations law, if that law affords 
a more forgiving principle of relation back than the one 
provided in this rule, it should be available to save the claim. 
Accord, Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st cir.1974). If 
Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S.Ct. 2379 (1986) implies the 
contrary, this paragraph is intended to make a material 
change in the rule. 
Paragraph (c)(3). This paragraph has been revised to 
change the result in Schiavone v. Fortune, supra, with 
respect to the problem of a misnamed defendant. An intend-
ed defendant who is notified of an action within the period 
allowed by Rule 4(m) [subdivision (m) in Rule 4 was a 
proposed subdivision which was withdrawn by the Supreme 
Court] for service of a summons and complaint may not 
under the revised rule defeat the action on account of a 
defect in the pleading with respect to the defendant's name, 
provided that the requirements of clauses (A) and (B) have 
been met. If the notice requirement is met within the Rule 
4(m) [subdivision (m) in Rule 4 was a proposed subdivision 
which was withdrawn by the Supreme Court] period, a 
complaint may be amended at any time to correct a formal 
defect such as a misnomer or misidentification. On the basis 
of the text of the former rule, the Court reached a result in 
Schiavone v. Fortune that was inconsistent with the liberal 
pleading practices secured by Rule 8. See Bauer, Schiavone: 
An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role 
as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 
Notre Dame L.Rev. 720 (1988); Brussack, Outrageous For-
tune: The Case for Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61 S.Cal. 
L.Rev. 671 (1988); Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal 
Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 86 
MicLL.Rev. 1507 (1987). 
Complete Annotation 
In allowing a name-correcting amendment within the time 
allowed by Rule 4(m), this rule allows not only the 120 days 
specified in that rule, but also any additional time resulting 
from any extension ordered by the court pursuant to that 
rule, as may be granted, for example, if the defendant is a 
fugitive from service of the summons. 
This revision, together with the revision of Rule 4(i) with 
respect to the failure of a plaintiff in an action against the 
United States to effect timely service on all the appropriate 
officials, is intended to produce results contrary to those 
reached in Gardner v. Gartman, 880 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1989), 
Rys v. U.S. Postal Service, 886 F.2d 443 (1st Cir. 1989), 
Martin's Food & Liquor, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 14 
F.R.D.3d 86 (N.D.I11.1988). But cf Montgomery v. United 
States Postal Service, 867 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1989), Warren v. 
Department of the Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Miles v. Department of the Army, 881 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 
1989), Barsten v. Department of the Interior, 896 F.2d 422 
(9th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Georgia Dept of Revenue, 881 F.2d 
1018 (11th Cir. 1989). 
1993 Amendments 
The amendment conforms the cross reference to Rule 4 to 
the revision of that rule. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
Effective and Applicability Provisions 
1991 Acts. Section 11(a) of Pub.L. 102-198 amended subd. 
(c)(3) of this rule, as transmitted to the Congress by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to section 2074 of title 28, United 
States Code, to become effective on December 1, 1991. 
R u l e 1 6 . Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; 
Management 
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any ac-
tion, the court may in its discretion direct the attor-
neys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to 
appear before it for a conference or conferences be-
fore trial for such purposes as 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so 
that the case will not be protracted because of lack 
of management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through 
more thorough preparation, and; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and Planning. Except in catego-
ries of actions exempted by district court rule as 
inappropriate, the district judge, or a magistrate 
judge when authorized by district court rule, shall, 
after receiving the report from the parties under Rule 
26(f) or after consulting with the attorneys for the 
parties and any unrepresented parties by a scheduling 
conference, telephone, mail, or other suitable means, 
enter a scheduling order that limits the time 
ials, see Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Appellate jurisdiction. the ground that a claim for relief then exists 
Third party by defendant. against the third-party defendant, but on the 
—Grounds. ground that the third-party defendant "may be 
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim. liable" to the defendant in the principal action. 
Cited. Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 
A „ , . . ,. .. 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.P. 54(b), ap-
 U n t i m e l y m o t i o n t o ^ ^ counterclaim. 
plies when the trial court orders a separate T ^
 t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t ion in 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
 d e n ^ m Q t i o n s to ^ ^ R c o u n t e r c l a i m and t 0 
third-party claim, and failure to have the case
 b r i ^ ^ d e f e n d a n t s w h ich were 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving m j 10 4.1.1*. J. *x. j -*.- i r XT. 4. . -n J filed 13 months after an answer to the com-lssues and parties before that court, will de- , . .
 £ 1 J , , i 1 r .1 i-t. ii * _i. r- • J- i.- plauit was filed and two weeks before the pnve the appellate court of jurisdiction over an ^ , , , ,
 L . , , , , r ., 
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 s cheduled trial date, where reasons for the 
(Utah 1991) untimely motion were inadequate and where 
the parties failed to demonstrate that the 
Third party by defendant. court's denial of the motions resulted in preju-
dice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 R2d 794 (Utah Ct. 
—Grounds.
 A p p 1 9 8 7 ) 
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor 
impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc., 
defendant in the initial action does so, not on 743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 188 A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution or 
et seq. indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84. A.L.R.4th 338. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after 
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
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which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
- This rule is similar to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Amendments. 
—Actual notice. 
-—After pretrial order. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Prolix complaint. 
—Amendment of response. 
—Answer. 
To include counterclaim. 
—Complaint. 
To defeat motion for summary judgment. 
lb include damages. 
—Considerations. 
Prejudice. 
—Court's discretion. 
Abused. 
Not abused. 
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend. 
—Following dismissal. 
—Late amendment. 
Day of trial. 
During or after trial. 
—Pro se petitions. 
—Reply amounting to amendment. 
—"Responsive pleading." 
—Substitution of parties. 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
—Allowed. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
—Amendment unnecessary. 
Consent to try issue. 
Evidence supporting findings. 
Issue raised by complaint. 
—Construction of rule. 
—Defense not pleaded. 
Affirmative defense. 
Issue tried by parties. 
—Failure to object to evidence. 
—Issues not pleaded. 
Mutual mistake. 
—Jury instruction as amendment. 
—New cause of action. 
Child support. 
—New theory of recovery. 
—Not allowed. 
No consent to try issue. 
—Notice. 
—Prejudice. 
—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried. 
Construction. 
Issues tried by consent. 
Relation back of amendments. 
—New parties. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Untimely service of original complaint. 
Supplemental pleadings. 
—Answers. 
Allowed. 
Not allowed. 
Cited. 
Amendments. 
—Actual notice. 
The validity of an amendment turns on ac-
tual notice, not on whether process has been 
served. Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, 
977 P.2d 497. 
—After pretrial order. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing defendant to amend his answer to 
include as a defense an issue that had been 
specifically excluded as a trial issue by a pre-
trial order, where the amendment was made 
long before trial, the opposing party had ade-
quate opportunity to meet the additional issue 
raised, and neither party was placed in a posi-
tion of any greater advantage or disadvantage 
or prejudice by virtue of the amendment to the 
pleading. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 
1981). 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Where, as a condition to filing their fourth 
amended complaint, appellants agreed to pay a 
$150 attorney fee, it was neither coercive nor 
unfair to them and is not a ground for reversal 
regardless of whether or not the payment of 
such attorney's fees are authorized by the 
Rules. The alternative was to dismiss, and in 
granting a dismissal without prejudice the 
court could stay any new action that might be 
commenced until costs of the action that had 
been dismissed including attorney's fees had 
been paid. The appellants invited the court to 
impose such conditions in order to avoid a 
dismissal and the necessity of starting over 
again. Tebbs & Tebbs v. Oliveto, 123 Utah 158, 
256 P.2d 699 (1953). 
Prolix complaint. 
Where complaint was prolix rather than be-
ing a short, concise statement of a claim as 
contemplated by Rules 8(a) and 8(e)(1), it was 
reasonable to permit plaintiff to redraft plead-
ings rather than dismiss the action without 
prejudice. McGavin v. Preferred Ins. Exch., 7 
Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958). 
—Amendment of response. 
Whether a motion to amend a response to an 
amended complaint should be allowed more 
than ten days after the amended complaint was 
filed lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
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court. Wasescha v. Terra, Inc., 528 P.2d 802 
(Utah 1974). 
—Answer. 
To include counterclaim. 
In personal injury action in which defen-
dant's insurer was furnishing lawyer to defend 
insured and lawyer had not met defendant 
until just before taking his deposition and 
therefore did not know that defendant had 
injuries and believed plaintiff to have been at 
fault, refusal to allow amendment of answer to 
include counterclaim was an abuse of discretion 
since case was one where "justice requires" 
amendment. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 
165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971). 
—Complaint. 
To defeat motion for summary judg-
ment. 
An unverified amendment of a pleading 
should not be allowed to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment if the amendment does not 
effect any substantial change in the issues as 
they were originally formulated in the plead-
ings. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 
624 (1960). 
To include damages. 
Trial court did not err in allowing plaintiffs to 
amend their complaint to include damages, 
even though plaintiffs' original complaint was 
in equity for an injunction, where such amend-
ment did not import into the case a new and 
different cause of action. Hjorth v. 
Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P2d 907 
(1952). 
—Considerations. 
In considering motions to amend pleadings, 
primary considerations are whether parties 
have adequate notice to meet new issues and 
whether any party receives an unfair advan-
tage or disadvantage. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc., 786 R2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Prejudice. 
A primary consideration that a trial judge 
must take into account in determming whether 
leave should be granted to amend pleadings 
during trial is whether the opposing side would 
be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an 
issue adjudicated for which he had not had time 
to prepare. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 
P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). 
Trial court did not err in refusing plaintiffs 
permission to amend complaint by pleading 
adverse possession, where plaintiffs had earlier 
indicated that they would not rely on adverse 
possession and had failed to show requisite 
payment of taxes on disputed parcels. Stratford 
v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), overruled 
on other grounds, Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 R2d 
417 (Utah 1990). 
—Court's discretion. 
" Abused. 
Trial court abused its discretion when it 
neither allowed the plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint to conform to an issue raised for the first 
time at trial nor allowed him to try the newly 
raised issue, although both parties consented to 
trial of the new issue. Lloyd's Unlimited v. 
Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd., 753 R2d 507 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
Trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
state the reasons for its denial of a motion to 
amend a complaint, and as the reasons for 
denial were not apparent from the record, the 
case was remanded for the trial court to assess 
all the factors to be considered to determine 
whether leave to amend was appropriate. Au-
rora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 
970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998). 
Not abused. 
Although this rule tends to favor granting 
leave to amend a pleading, the matter remains 
in the sound discretion of the trial court; such 
discretion was not abused in refusing plaintiff's 
requested leave to amend his complaint where 
the amendment would have delayed the trial 
and the substance of plaintiff's new allegation 
was known a full year earlier. Westley v. Farm-
er's Ins. Exch., 663 R2d 93 (Utah 1983). 
Trial court acted within its discretion in de-
nying plaintiff's motion to amend her com-
plaint to include two additional defendants 
where the case had been pending for over three 
years but plaintiff waited until just before trial 
to make her motion. Kelly v. Utah Power & 
Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it did not allow appellant to amend her com-
plaint for a second time in a three-year-old case 
about an eight-year-old injury. Kleinert v. 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow plaintiff to amend its com-
plaint and add new parties and claims more 
than four years after the case commenced and 
after a trial had been held to resolve the fun-
damental issue in the case, especially given the 
fact that plaintiff knew that all of the parties it 
sought to add were involved with each other 
from the outset of the case and could have been 
joined in a timely manner. R & R Energies v. 
Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068 (Utah 
1997). 
Court properly Tefused to allow third 
amended complaint after partial summary 
judgment was entered and discovery was com-
pleted because the complaint could be filed as a 
new court action and allowing the amendment 
would have delayed a case that had been pend-
ing for years. Harper v. Summit County, 963 
P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, granted, 
982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1999). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying a plaintiff's motion to amend his com-
plaint to raise new issues, filed over two 
months after the discovery deadline in the case 
and after both sides had moved for summary 
judgment, as the plaintiff was aware of the 
"new issues" long before filing the motion to 
amend. Atcitty ex rel. Atcitty v. Board of Educ, 
967 P.2d 1261 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
—Dismissal without opportunity to 
amend. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
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dismissing an action without first allowing 
plaintiff an opportunity to amend where the 
record showed that plaintiff was allowed to 
amend his original complaint but no amend-
ment of substance was contained in the 
amended complaint and that the trial court 
granted continuances for plaintiff's conve-
nience at the hearings upon the motions to 
dismiss but plaintiff never appeared at any of 
the hearings except the final motion to recon-
sider and set aside the order of dismissal. Davis 
Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 P.2d 988, 
cert, denied, 348 U.S. 900, 75 S. Ct. 221, 99 L. 
Ed. 706 (1954). 
Trial court abused its discretion in dismiss-
ing an action with prejudice for failure to join 
indispensable parties, and not allowing an 
amendment or granting a continuance, even 
though defendant claimed no surprise but 
merely relied on the likelihood of increased 
costs and complexity if the amendment were 
granted. Intermountain Physical Medicine 
Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (Ct. App. 1987). 
—Following dismissal. 
An order of dismissal is a final adjudication, 
and thereafter a complaint cannot be amended. 
Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 
(1972); Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1976). 
—Late amendment. 
Plaintiff who did not seek leave to amend his 
pleading until nearly two years after he had 
filed his answer was not entitled to leave to 
amend. Mountain Am. Credit Union v. 
McClellan, 854 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 862 P2d 1356 (Utah 1993). 
Day of trial. 
Trial court did not err in refusing to permit 
an amended answer presented for the first time 
at the commencement of the trial. See Hein's 
Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing 
Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 
(1970). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying plaintiff's motion to amend the com-
plaint where the amendment was not sought 
until the day of trial and it proposed to intro-
duce new and different causes of action. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion, made on the day of 
the trial, to amend its answer to assert the 
statute of limitations as a defense where the 
essential facts upon which the statute of limi-
tations could have been asserted were known to 
the defendant from the beginning and defen-
dant alleged no surprise, discovery of new evi-
dence relating to the defense, or other justifica-
tion for its delay in asserting the statute of 
limitations as a defense. Staker v. Huntington 
Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 
1983). 
During or after trial. 
The rule permitting amendment of pleadings 
is to be liberally construed so as to further the 
interests of justice; however, the rule is to be 
applied with less liberality when the amend-
ments are proposed during or after trial, rather 
than before trial. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 
245 (Utah 1983). 
—Pro se petitions. 
Pro se petitioner for extraordinary relief 
should have been allowed to amend his petition 
to make it clear that he was not challenging his 
conviction. Stack v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 1999 
UT 76, 985 P2d 243. 
—Reply amounting to amendment. 
Trial court did not err in allowing the plain-
tiff to file a reply in the proceeding as it was 
nothing more than an amendment to plaintiffs 
complaint. It is the substance and not the name 
of a pleading that determines its character. 
Wells v. WeUs, 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P.2d 167 
(1954). 
—"Responsive pleading.* 
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive plead-
ing which would preclude an opponent from 
amending a complaint under Subdivision (a) 
"once as a matter of course." Heritage Bank & 
Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
—Substitution of parties. 
Although an unincorporated voluntary asso-
ciation did not cure the defect in its complaint 
by complying with the assumed name statute 
or retaining licensed counsel to represent it, the 
substitution of the plaintiff was a permissible 
means of remedying the deficiencies in the 
original complaint, given the state's liberal 
rules governing the amendment of pleadings. 
Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Mgt. & 
Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist., 1999 UT 
App 136, 979 P.2d 363, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1999). 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
—Allowed. 
In action to recover wages for services ren-
dered where complaint was based on both an 
express contract and on quantum meruit, and 
court struck quantum meruit after plaintiffs 
evidence was in, and reinstated it at the close of 
the defendants' evidence, such ruling on the 
part of the court was not error in absence of 
showing that the employer was misled or pre-
vented from presenting all its evidence, since 
the ruling was equivalent to a rule permitting 
an amendment to conform to proof. Morris v. 
Russell, 120 Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451, 26 
A.L.R.2d 947 (1951). 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Allowing amendment of the pleadings to con-
form with the evidence adduced at trial is much 
preferred to the alternative of dismissal, espe-
cially where a trial has proceeded to conclusion 
on the existing pleadings and where the defen-
dant has suffered no prejudice by reason of any 
deficiency in the pleadings. Gill v. Timm, 720 
P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986). 
—Amendment unnecessary. 
Consent to try issue. 
In quiet title action, trial court erred when it 
denied plaintiff's motion for leave to amend 
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pleading to conform to evidence, but outcome 
was not affected since issues were before the 
court by consent of both parties. Poulsen v. 
Poulsen, 672 R2d 97 (Utah 1983). 
Evidence support ing findings. 
Where pleading did not fill the requirement 
of Rule 8(a) but the evidence supported finding 
that defendant did owe certain amount, failure 
to amend fully the pleadings to this effect was 
nonprejudicial in view of rule. Seamons v. 
Andersen, 122 Utah 497, 252 R2d 209 (1952). 
Issue ra ised by complaint. 
Wholesaler's complaint that fishing boats 
were defective and not fit for purposes intended 
was sufficient to raise the issue of breach of 
express and implied warranty, without amend-
ment of the pleadings. Pacific Marine 
Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Corp., 525 P.2d 
615 (Utah 1974). 
—Construct ion of rule. 
This rule should be read as having two parts, 
the first of which is applicable when issues not 
raised in the pleadings are tried by the express 
or implied consent of the parties, and the sec-
ond of which is applicable where a motion to 
amend is made in response to an objection to 
the introduction of evidence; in the first case 
the trial court has no discretion whether to 
allow amendment of the pleadings and must do 
so; only in the second case may the court 
determine whether prejudice, undue delay in 
amending or laches ought to prevent the 
amendment. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 
1976). 
—Defense not pleaded. 
Affirmative defense. 
Defendant was not entitled to an amendment 
of the pleadings under this rule so as to assert 
the defense of a statute of limitation where all 
of the facts necessary were pleaded and there 
was no new or different evidence. Defendant 
failed to assert the defense and it was waived. 
Apparently it was defendant's intention to 
waive the defense until it was discovered dur-
ing the trial tha t plaintiff's evidence seriously 
weakened defendant's defense. Goelt2s v. Conti-
nental Bank & Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 
H2d 832 (1956). 
Although Rule 8(c) requires tha t affirmative 
defenses be pleaded, it must be looked to in 
light of the fundamental purpose of the rules of 
liberalizing pleading and procedure to the end 
that parties can present all their legitimate 
contentions; all tha t parties are entitled to is 
notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to 
nieet them; therefore, where defendants did not 
plead subsequent agreement as an affirmative 
defense to action on prior agreement and plain-
tiff, whose objection to evidence on subsequent 
agreement was overruled, sought no continu-
ance and did not claim surprise or disadvan-
tage in meeting the new issue, trial court not 
°nly did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
jssue to be raised and receiving evidence on it 
put it would have failed the plain mandate of 
Justice had it refused to do so. Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963). 
Failure to raise the defense of usury in an 
answer to a complaint constituted a waiver of 
the defense that could not be cured by amend-
ment of the answer after evidence had been 
presented. Meyer v Deluke, 23 Utah 2d 74, 457 
P.2d 966 (1969). 
Under Subdivision (b), the fact that a de-
fense, even an affirmative defense, has not been 
formally pleaded is immaterial if the issue has 
been tried by express or implied consent. Gen-
eral Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976). 
Although estoppel was an affirmative defense 
which was not raised in the pleadings, where 
the evidence offered at trial supported the prin-
ciple, the trial courts grant of motion to amend 
the pleadings to conform to evidence of estoppel 
would not be overturned absent a showing of 
abuse of discretion. Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. 
Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977). 
Where the defendant had not moved to 
amend its answer to add an affirmative defense 
after the plaintiff objected to the raising of the 
defense at trial and the trial court did not 
under take the requisite procedural steps for 
determining whether to allow an amencjment, 
the court abused its discretion in permitting 
the defense. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., 
Inc., 1999 UT 13, 974 P.2d 288. 
Issue tried by parties . 
Underlying purpose of rule is that judgment 
should be granted in accordance with law and 
evidence as ends of justice require, whether the 
pleadings are actually amended or not; even 
though defendants did not plead a particular 
defense, that should not have precluded them 
from relying on that defense if that was what 
justice required and if case was actually tried 
on a different issue or a different theory than 
was pleaded. First Sec. Bank v. Colonial Ford, 
Inc., 597 P.2d 859 (Utah 1979). 
Trial judge erred in concluding that defen-
dant waived a defense by failing to raise it in 
his pretrial pleadings where the issue was tried 
by the parties. Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 
681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984). 
—Fai lure to object to ev idence . 
Where defendant had ample opportunity to 
present contrary evidence and did not object to 
plaintiff's evidence on grounds that it was not 
within issues of case, defendant could not com-
plain of findings based on this evidence. Draper 
v. J .B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 
P.2d 360 (1952). 
Where plaintiff failed to object to the presen-
tation of evidence of defendant's counterclaim 
at trial, the trial court was within its discretion 
in permitting defendant to amend his pleadings 
to conform to the evidence introduced at trial. 
England v. Horbach, 944 R2d 340 (Utah 1997). 
— I s s u e s not pleaded. 
Mutual mistake. 
Even though the issue of mutual mistake was 
not raised by the pleadings, it would have been 
proper for the court, in consonance with Rule 
54(c)(1), to have reformed the contract if a 
mutual mistake of fact had been established by 
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clear and convincing evidence. Mabey v. Kay 
Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
—Jury instruction as amendment. 
A trial court may permit jury instructions 
covering the parties' theories, if warranted, to 
substitute for amendment of the pleadings to 
conform to evidence. Zions First Natl Bank v. 
Rocky Mt. Irrigation, Inc., 795 R2d 658 (Utah 
1990). 
—New cause of action. 
Amendment may be allowed if it does not 
change the liability sought to be enforced 
against the defendant. While in a technical 
sense it may be a new cause of action yet it may 
be allowed if it is not a wholly different cause of 
action or legal obligation. Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 
2d 241, 272 R2d 167 (1954). 
Child support. 
Where wife brought independent action for 
child support claiming that prior child support 
award was void, but court held prior award 
valid, court did not err in allowing wife to 
amend her complaint to seek arrearage on prior 
award since amended complaint would still 
deal with same cause of action, namely, child 
support. Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241,272 P.2d 
167 (1954). 
—New theory of recovery. 
If a theory of recovery is fully tried by the 
parties, the court may base its decision on that 
theory and deem the pleadings amended, even 
if the theory was not originally pleaded or set 
forth in the pleadings or the pretrial order. 
However, that the issue has, in fact, been tried, 
and that this procedure has been authorized by 
express or implied consent of the parties, must 
be evident from the record. Colman v. Colman, 
743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
—Not allowed. 
In bank's action to recover on promissory 
note guaranteed by defendants, trial court 
properly denied defendants' motion, made after 
presentation of all the evidence, to amend their 
answers to allege that they had signed their 
guaranty under mistake, since there was no 
change in theory of issue, and since trial court 
had found that defendants knew what they 
were signing. First Sec. Bank v. Colonial Ford, 
Inc., 597 P2d 859 (Utah 1979). 
No consent to try issue. 
Where a defendant merely referred to a cer-
tain contract in his briefs and in testimony at 
trial and the plaintiff offered no evidence on the 
issue of the contract in her pleadings or briefs, 
the defendant neither expressly or impliedly 
consented to try any issues relating to the 
contract, and the plaintiff was not permitted to 
amend her complaint to conform to the alleged 
proof regarding the contract. Archuleta v. 
Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998). 
—Notice. 
If an issue is to be tried and a party's rights 
concluded with respect thereto, he must have 
notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it. 
When a party has had such notice and oppor-
tunity, trial of the issue raised is fair; this rule 
accordingly allows liberal amendments if the 
issue is tried "by express or implied consent of 
the parties." National Farmers' Union Property 
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
—Prejudice. 
A party must not be prejudiced in any way by 
the introduction of new issues, but where an 
impleaded partnership issue was raised at 
trial, was not objected to by defendant, and 
both sides went into facts of the partnership, 
there was no error in finding on the issue since 
there was no indication defendant was sur-
prised or misled by introduction of the issue. 
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226,310 
P.2d 517 (1957). 
—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried. 
In action to set aside certain deeds, the 
prayer of the complaint that the deeds "be 
declared null and void" did not open the door to 
allow the trial court to find the deeds invalid on 
any ground that might be urged at the trial; but 
it was restricted to the grounds set forth in the 
complaint, or tried by the express or implied 
consent of the parties. Mitchell v. Palmer, 121 
Utah 245, 240 P.2d 970 (1952). 
Construction. 
The rules of civil procedure must all be 
looked to in the light of their even more funda-
mental purpose of liberalizing both pleading 
and procedure to the end that the parties are 
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to 
their dispute. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 
P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). 
Issues tried by consent. 
Where the parties, in an action on an insur-
ance policy, stipulated in their pleadings that 
the value of a building was $2,000 and while 
the trial was in progress one of the parties 
testified that he was to receive $1,000 for the 
building in a sale, such testimony did not put 
the value of the building in issue, as alone it did 
not amount to consent to try the issue of the 
value of the building. National Farmers' Union 
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
Issue of oral modification of written agree-
ment was tried by implied consent when par-
ties clearly focused at trial on the oral repre-
sentations and their likely effect on the original 
escrow agreement. George Fisher, Jr. Family 
Inter Vivos Revocable Trust v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 
1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Even though plaintiff did not include the 
issue of forcible entry in his complaint, the trial 
court properly considered the issue where the 
facts were sufficient to show that defendant 
tried the claim by implied consent. Keller v. 
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 
(Utah 1998). 
Relation back of amendments. 
—New parties. 
Generally, Subdivision (c) does not apply to 
amendments that substitute or add new parties 
to those brought before the court by the original 
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pleadings, because such amendmeats amount 
to assertion of a new cause of action and defeat 
the purpose of statutes of limitations, but an 
exception to this rule exists, as to both plaintiff 
and defendant, when new and old parties have 
an identity of interest, so it can be assumed or 
proved that relation back is not prejudicial. 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P2d 902 (Utah 
1976); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 R2d 581 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The relation-back doctrine did not apply to 
amended third-party complaint where there 
was no identity of interest with the existing 
parties other than privity of contract, since 
privity of contract is insufficient identity of 
interest for purpose of Subdivision (c) of this 
rule. Perry v. Pioneer Whsle. Supply Co., 681 
R2d 214 (Utah 1984); Russell v. Standard 
Corp., 898 R2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
Where plaintiff sought to amend complaint to 
include claims against third-party defendant, 
but plaintiff's claims against third party were 
not comparable in theory or damages sought to 
defendant's third-party complaint, third party 
did not have notice of plaintiff's potential 
claims against him within the period of the 
statute of limitations, nor did he have .an iden-
tity of interest with those originally named as 
defendants. Consequently, the amended com-
plaint did not relate back to the original com-
plaint and was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P2d 581 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
While generally Subdivision (c) will not apply 
to an amendment that substitutes or adds new 
parties, an exception applies when new and old 
parties have an identity of interest, so it can be 
assumed or proved the relation back is not 
prejudicial. The exception is particularly valid 
when the real parties in interest were suffi-
ciently alerted to the proceedings. Wilcox v. 
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996). 
Where the parents incorrectly named as de-
fendants in the original complaint's caption had 
an identity of interest with their children, who 
were the actual defendants, relating the 
amendment to the complaint back would not 
have been prejudicial, since the parents were 
served with the complaint, the body of which 
clearly identified the actual defendants as the 
negligent parties, and service on the two mi-
nors could properly be accomplished by service 
on their parents at the boys' homes. Sulzen v. 
Williams, 1999 UT App 76, 977 P.2d 497. 
Relating an amended pleading back to the 
date of the original filing was proper when 
there was a sufficient identity of interest be-
tween the original and the substituted plain-
tiffs and neither the substitution nor the delay 
prejudiced the defendant. Graham v. Davis 
County Solid Waste Mgt. & Energy Recovery 
Special Serv. Dist., 1999 UT App 136, 979 P.2d 
363, cert, denied, 994 R2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
—Statute of l imitat ions. 
Amendments are allowed to complaints and 
process, even though the amendment relates 
back to the time of original filing and even 
though, but for the right to amend, the statute 
of limitations period would have run. Meyers v. 
Interwest Corp., 632 R2d 879 (Utah 1981). 
Relation back is allowed under the rules even 
if a statute of limitations has run during the 
intervening time. Rmgwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Once the time for filing a lien foreclosure 
action has expired, the court lacks authority to 
revive the lien by permitting amendment under 
Rule 15(c). Diehl Lumber Transp. v. Mickelson, 
802 P.2d 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Untimely service of original complaint. 
The amendment of a complaint dismissed for 
untimely service must also be dismissed. Cook 
v. Starkey, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976). 
Supplemental pleadnngs. 
—Answers . 
Al lowed. 
In quiet title action it is not error to permit 
amendment of defendants' pleadings to assert 
an interest in claims relocated after suit was 
filed but before trial. Stevens v. Memmott, 9 
Utah 2d 37, 337 P2d 418 (1959). 
Not al lowed. 
In taxpayers' suit seeking to set aside sale of 
part of tract of city property, where the com-
plaint urged tha t the sale was void for irregu-
larity of city council procedure and asked for an 
order that the claimants be required to remove 
structures placed on the property, a motion of 
the defendants for permission to file a supple-
mental answer showing a subsequent at tempt 
to satisfy the requirements of § 10-8-8 was 
properly denied since the supplemental plead-
ing was not an answer to the facts alleged in 
the complaint, nor justification for denying the 
relief prayed, except that part of the complaint 
that sought removal of the structures. Rowley 
v. Milford City, 10 Utah 2d 299, 352 R2d 225 
(1960). 
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Rule 16, Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and manage-
ment conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon 
motion of a party, may direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepre-
sented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for 
such purposes as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be 
protracted for lack of management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(6) considering all matters as may aid in the disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conference and orders. In any action, in 
addition to any other pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court, 
upon its own motion or upon the motion of a party, may conduct a scheduling 
and management conference. The attorneys and unrepresented parties shall 
appear at the scheduling and management conference in person or by remote 
electronic means. Regardless whether a scheduling and management confer-
ence is held, on motion of a party the court shall enter a scheduling order that 
governs the time: 
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; 
(2) ,to file motions; and 
(3) to complete discovery. 
The scheduling order may also include: 
(4) modifications of the times for disclosures under Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(1) 
and of the extent of discovery to be permitted; 
(5) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, 
and trial; and 
(6) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
Unless the order sets the date of trial, any party may and the plaintiff shall, 
at the close of all discovery, certify to the court that the case is ready for trial. 
The court shall schedule the trial as soon as mutually convenient to the court 
